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The University as the apex level of learning can only be better appreciated in terms of its 
preoccupation as a definitive source for knowledge enrichment. With plethora of programmes, 
and an emphasis on specialisation, some narrow parochialism may well confront its entrant. This 
concern is checked by the encouragement of cross-disciplinary interests that find a staunch 
elaboration in the teaching and promotion of General Studies programmes. And for core 
students of Science and Technology, the problematic of grasping the idea of the “other science” 
has been a daunting task. By explaining the nature, character and components of a dualised 
Science, it is hoped that some understanding may be gained to help ameliorate the difficulties 
faced by both in accepting and comprehending the wholesome nature of the scientific realm. 
Thus, natural science and social science come under review in this paper as a preliminary 
exposition to the bifurcated world of science and how to appreciate its knowledge claims.
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Introductory Note: The Idea of a University 
University programmes operate at the apex level of knowledge acquisition, and mainly for the 
development of first-rated manpower. By implication therefore, Universities serve the useful purpose of human 
resource development through teaching and research necessary for the shaping and sharpening of minds and, 
indeed, for the development of a virile workforce. To be privileged to undergo university training then provides 
the individual a handsome opportunity to fully develop ones mental climate, and to realize potentials in its 
fullest extent.
Such enterprise, as university learning entails, bears on the exposition of the individual to scholastic 
rigour.  The latter assumes a ramified character, and this is revealed in the plethora of disciplines to which 
interested parties are attracted to profoundly explore. The idea of the university then must be properly 
understood in terms of that process of academic engagement involving encounters between people of different 
vocational interests and within a multiplicity of disciplines. It is intended to raise a self-reliant individual 
developed in the best tradition of a critical mind. Thus, the primary basis for attaining and attending to university 
programmes is to acquire a critical mind that can enable one respond effectively and efficiently to the challenges 
of a literate and increasingly complex world.
In the university, with taught and research programmes, undergraduates and graduate students are 
treated to training and retraining programmes with credible information much needed to update knowledge and 
to attend to day- to day living. We cannot overstate then, the raging problematic that is associated with 
ignorance, and its inherently abhorrent status. It is with a view to confining ignorance to the backwaters that 
people undertake the task of updating information. For, only credible and valid information or knowledge can 
take us to the next level. Therefore, it is a worthy aspiration to make a choice for apex learning interests through 
obtaining admission and studying in a university.
Yet there is need to fully grasp the implication of such choice as admittance to face a life immersed in 
rigour, as well as excitement. With the mixes of pleasure and pain, one can understand the universalism that 
characterizes a university. The latter, as institutions of learning, play host to programmes ordered as 
disciplinary engagements that straddle the Arts, Humanities, Management and Actuarial Sciences, Social 
Sciences and Natural Sciences. The menu is quite enormous to choose from. But it is often advised or, indeed, 
conventional to settle for one thing at a time. By so saying, it is anticipated that students draw on a particular 
discipline to begin a march towards specialisation in a field of endeavour.
By making a choice for a particular study, we find the other engaged students with a variety of 
disciplinary interests to suggest immediately to us the limitations we suffer in terms of the extent of 
knowledge there is to acquire, and what we can really afford at a specific point in time. What is emphasized on 
is that, in the plethora of courses or disciplines to which we do not rightly belong, there exists enormity of 
knowledge claim that is on offer, worth our attention, but to which we cannot completely lay claim. This 
obvious fact presents us with a remarkable reminder of our limitations for which reason we may be hemmed in 
by parochialism that stem from the pursuit of a specific kind of knowledge. Hence, the General Studies 
Programmes in Nigerian Universities have become mediatory study engagements through which we can be 
relieved of ever disturbing parochialism associated with pursuit of narrow knowledge claims.
Therefore, the National Universities Commission, the regulatory body entrusted with accreditation of 
university programmes, deems it necessary to enlarge the knowledge base of students to check the 
problematic of ignorance that stems from parochial academic pursuits by allowing first hand experience on 
cross disciplinary interests among university students and university taught programmes. As a matter of fact, 
it ranks as statutory that students must pass the programmes to make for their graduation. Thus, floating fine 
mixes of Arts, Science and Social Science programmes, students are enjoined to peruse through a view lens, to 
explore for themselves, what preoccupies other areas of knowledge.
This is most necessary to accord students a sense of balance in their perceptions of the extent of the 
knowledge arena and, more so, to enable them cultivate a habit of respect for their likes that are in pursuit of 
other kinds of knowledge claims. Hence, arts oriented students, in the context of the General Studies 
programmes, May be treated to such subjects like science and mankind; science students may be invited to 
explore challenges in cultural studies, education and social sciences, which hardly form the core of their 
choice disciplines. Being part of this intellectual exchange experience, over the years, have produced 
rewarding results as vast number of students can say, at least, something about others. Thus, it is with a 
concern for broadening the views of students to erase the problematic of parochialism that stem from narrow 
specialization that the General Studies programmes are instituted, and remain as an active educational force in 
Nigerian academia. So far, Arts and Social Science Students are encouraged to embrace the knowledge of 
science, just as Science and Technology students are welcome to the idea of Arts and Social Sciences. With 
this as backdrop, this paper seeks to serve the purpose of a preliminary exposition not only the idea of the 
University and the General Studies programmes, but more importantly, to make the case for a stand  the Social 
Sciences  to students of science and technological orientation.
In what follows, we shall be examining concerns about science - that knowledge-driven engagement 
to which all science and technology students tend to preoccupy themselves with. Essentially, the core of our 
interest is to expose the “other science”  social science  by way of interrogating the nature of the natural 
science order from where it purports to draw life. We intend that it serves as a springboard for launching our 
understanding of social sciences to which such programmes like “Nigerian and African Cultural 
Development” or “Polity and Economy of Nigeria” belongs.
The Experience of Science
Science is an ever-engaging experiential concern. In current terms, there is a driving preoccupation 
with science, the scientific disciplines and scientific investigations. Therefore, given its ever- engaging 
nature, it will not be out of place to talk about the ubiquity of science, as science connotes an ever-present 
reality. Indeed, it expresses our constant, if consistent, effort to understand as it “Is”.  Basically, because it 
points up to our effort to understand nature, science depicts knowledge  knowledge of nature as it “is” rather 
than what it “ought to be”. To the extent that it hardly escapes our memory, then, the ubiquity of science can 
easily be felt in the reality of technological products emerging from it that make their presence before us. 
From the packaging of sweets to consumption of drugs, the constant uses of refined products of nature, and 
even the invention of synthetic products, we articulate concerns about pains and pleasure before the alter of 
science.
Today's world then, is essentially a technologically driven world that is predicated on science. The 
impact of science has taken considerable toll on populations globally. It dictates and determines the pace of 
human and material development that can be assigned to respective locales. Certainly, it appears that there 
is no way we can deny or ignore the heavy presence of science in our world. In a nutshell, we are left to 
admit that the globe is affected with science, and can only get better with more science. This is particularly 
so in our ever increasing quest for precision and incontrovertible information.
Often times, when we preoccupy our minds with science and scientific development, it is usually 
to natural sciences that we think about, focus and draw upon. To this end, the reality of its nature appears a 
bit confounding. As a subject matter, the very nature of science admits more than a single shade of interest.
While scientific knowledge allows us to reason towards the natural sciences, it little occurs to us 
that there also exists the “other science”. Natural science then, is not, and does not exclusively provide as 
the single shade of interest in the realm of scientific interests. Therefore, much as natural science exists and 
exerts enormous influence on society, it is not completely right to assume that it speaks all the truth in 
defining the wholesome nature of the scientific enterprise. Perhaps we need to note that we derive the 
scientific enterprise by observing and doing; and that in all of these, man is central to its articulation and 
successes.
It hardly occurs to us that much as reality or nature can be assessed from objective 
experimentations with inanimate elements in time and space, equally the same interest can be expressed 
and exercised in respect of man, who, himself, is the most important product of nature. Thus, whether man 
is studying nature by articulating his daily observations upon inanimate elements, or he is preoccupied 
with engaging self as a subject of scrutiny, we often sense the penchant to ascertain regularities in patterns 
of behaviour of the inanimate elements or pulsating human beings respectively. Persistent observations on 
regularities in patterns of behaviour through experiential endeavours allow us to dwell within the confines 
of an embedded scientific interest. For in both turns, man is both object and subject of scientific 
investigation, as both conductor and beneficiary of the outcomes that ensue from there. To the extent that 
man's behaviour can be subjected to careful observations enabling us not only to determine regularities in 
patterns of behaviours, but also in predicting outcomes on the basis of those observed regularities, man 
remains an object and subject matter of scientific investigation.
Scientific investigation, which more directly focuses on the actions and behaviours of man, invites 
us into the world of the social sciences. Here, a view lens is provided to study and understand man in terms 
of respective interests that range from his political and cultural origins, economic, behavioural and even 
his convergence in small groups. Hence, it makes sense to have an articulated study of man in the context 
of his organization for rule relationships (politics), his culture and origin in 'primitivity' (Anthropology), 
his relationship with production and distribution of wealth (Economics), his reading in terms of behaviour 
and attitudes (Psychology) and his organization as a group-driven being (Sociology).
From the foregoing, it implies that the world of science admits of a bifurcation into (a) the Natural 
Science and (b) the Social Science. In the latter case, Bluhm (1969:67) argues:
The behaviour of the individual person is taken as the basic unit of analysis. The relevant 
subject matters are the acts, attitudes, preferences, and expectations of Man in (social) 
contexts.
It is therefore, the case that the epicentre of the discourses in social science is man. He can be studied in 
terms of his organization of political life, economic, cultural origins, behaviours, and in his 
interactions/communication in small groups like wards, communities, nations and states.
To be sure, it would seem irrational to think that pulsating beings known for their flair for emotions 
can be held constant. Where this is very possible with inanimate objects, it proves rather difficult with man, 
whose persistent oscillations through love and hate have tended to affect the way he thinks and acts in 
varied circumstances. Such emotive considerations may well check our predictive abilities; and limit our 
quest for exactitude. It is in this respect that the enterprise of social science is often labelled inexact 
science.
By implication, the scientific realm is bifurcated into the strands of natural science and social 
science. Both strands represent spheres of knowledge claims with the aspiration to produce precise, if 
infallible, information upon which correct predictions and conclusions may be objectively derived from a 
set of observed regularities.
Natural science is the more popular and the springboard for launching the other. But we do not need 
to forcibly latch on the world of social sciences. Essentially, the social sciences can be viewed as a 
derivative of the natural sciences. In an effort to understand social sciences then, it makes sense to note that 
there is need to properly explicate the nature and character of the natural sciences. For this, we intend to 
provide a comparative platform for appraising the social sciences. Firstly, however, we acknowledge that 
natural science, which comprise such disciplinary engagements represented by the likes of mathematics, 
physics, chemistry and biology, and all of its derivatives, represent a set of knowledge claims having 
inanimate objects or elements as the focal point of interest. In other words, it imposes a definite focus on 
nature as the phenomenon depicting reality.
The Logic of Science
Science is knowledge. Yet knowledge can be for a number of things and possesses degrees of 
correctness depending on the sources. Basically, the globe has for long been treated to three major sources 
of knowledge. These sources are drawn from the standpoints of human intuition, which allows us to accord 
some reverence to deep thought, particularly when they are employed to serve as explanations to extant 
puzzles facing human groups. Magico-Religion provides us with another vital source of knowledge 
generation, for we can sense the performing act of the magician or feel and believe the priests' and prophets' 
claims about the deities as real.
Both Intuition and Magico-Religion, although they purport to offer explanations about nature, are 
of limited utility as their knowledge claims appear closed to non-initiates and prevent them from proper 
verification. In other words, both stands admit of relatively low degree of openness as to permit doubts to be 
freely proven for correctness. Thus, deep thought, make believe, and the spiritual essence then, are usually 
difficult subjects of proof for the next person other than the one professing or practicing the act with respect 
to replication by others.
The third knowledge source draws on the value of experience. By going through similar 
experiences, we can replicate earlier outcomes and even arrive at similar conclusions. This knowledge 
source is regarded as Empirical or Scientific knowledge. For, not only does it allow us to share in earlier 
experiences, the open character of its procedures allows us to verify and validate or falsify claims and 
conclusions reached by others. Therefore, empirical knowledge, as scientific knowledge, aspires to permit 
the generation of credible generalisation which holds true and true at all places and every time. By its very 
nature, it is its habit to seek for exactitude. The fact, or exactitude therefore, defines the major 
preoccupation of science. Thus, scientific knowledge is employed to describe and explain reality by 
representing an issue as it “is”. Therefore, only empirical knowledge qualifies as real scientific knowledge.
The natural science is embedded in scientific knowledge. To assert such a claim is to admit that the 
experiences located in that context permit of empirically grounded facts. Thus, it can only plead for 
exactitude and abhors speculations. As noted by Kurzman (1988:131), “the feature which distinguishes 
scientific discourses from all others (is) the adherence to scientific logic”. Weber (1946:143) goes ahead to 
underscore such claim in his assertion that
All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid; these are the 
general foundations of our (scientific) orientation in the world.
Essentially, it would seem that the logic of science is predicated on observation of what constitutes reality. It 
is the observable regularities in pattern that scientific investigation relies on to reach credible and factual 
conclusions. Therefore, mere speculation or opinion does not pass for the factual until it has undergone 
sufficient scrutiny to stand the test as a valid scientific statement. Thus, “observation (constitutes) an 
innovative (and useful) method” for approaching scientific or empirical investigation (Dargie, 1998:66).
Scientific knowledge represents a unique kind of knowledge claim because it tends to represent 
reality or nature as it is. Thus, the specificity of scientific knowledge claims can better be appreciated in its 
persistent bearing on precision or exactitude. In this wise, accuracy of information based on observable 
data cannot be compromised. Indeed, we often think of mathematical exactitude to qualify the acute 
observations and conclusions reached as scientific investigation. Thus, a triangle, as a label, must of 
necessity, assume three angles and three sides with the summation of all the angles at 180 degrees; a square 
also assumes the identity of an object of four equal sides and equal angles of 90 degrees each to make up a total 
sum of 360 degrees in all. For these objects, these characteristics hold true and true always irrespective of time 
and space, or whatever emotive interests we bear for them.
Therefore, it is the character of natural science that it allows no emotive interest from its practitioners 
or adherents. Hence, we tend to argue that scientific investigation must be entirely devoid of emotion in other 
to check distortion. It is in this respect that we assign to science the idea of being value free. For emotive 
interests taint the results that we reach such that our quest for exactitude or the factual becomes breached. As 
an empirically grounded engagement, natural science investigations rely very much on “the emphasis on the 
correctness of lived experience…” (Bruyn, 1966-7:317) derived from a detached stance from object of 
investigation to underscore their bearing with objectivity. Hence, Waizbort (2003:152) argues that, in drawing 
from scientific investigation,
it is in the nature of the empirical and methodological advances of the natural sciences (to 
ensure the) exert(ion) of considerable material and ideological influence on the history of 
societies, cultures and human lives. Reproducible experiences and controlled observations are 
taken as methodological exigencies for a discipline to be considered scientific and objective 
and not simply an illusory construction of the human mind unrelated to either natural or social 
reality. 
Indeed, the concerns expressed above have serious implications for understanding our endeavour in 
appreciating social scientific discourse in particular. For, in several instances that pretend to offer objective 
analysis of the situation, we find that there have been several intrusions that succeeded in rendering its 
'science' subjective. This concern can easily be felt in earlier representations of colonial anthropologists, also 
considered to be doing science, who offered many value-laden observations on indigenous societies. Today, it 
is doubtful if those earlier claims can stand the test as they are being refuted in the process of verification and 
validation made possible by the scientific method. Essentially, we need to approach science as the search for 
truth or reality. This is not considered in relativistic terms. Science seeks to deliver the truth as it “is” such that 
we can understand the real nature, character and patterns of the phenomenon called reality.
Therefore, the emphasis on scientific investigation entails, among other things, being able to describe 
and explain the phenomenon of reality in very precise terms. This would imply that scientific investigation is a 
fact-driven endeavour that seeks to understand what “is” rather than engage in what “ought to be”. By such 
characterization, emotive interests are usually kept outside of the confines of science. The intrusion of 
emotion into scientific investigation tends to taint the characterisation of reality. Thus, since it permits an 
investigator to inject value concerns which are apt to affect his findings, it is believed to diminish the worth and 
worthiness of science, properly so called. As such, where emotive interests prevail in the process of 
investigation, results or findings have tended to reveal subjective interests of the investigator. Ethical 
considerations are therefore, not admissible and permissible components of true, scientific investigation as 
they render our work value-laden.
The foregoing would imply that scientific investigation must display a penchant for value freeness. In 
other words, it is rational anticipation that all scientific investigators assume a disinterested disposition to the 
objects or elements of investigation. By so doing, the investigator succeeds in keeping values outside of his 
investigation to characterize his concerns as being value free. To the extent that the latter concern is achieved, 
such work, and the attendant findings, are said to be laced with objectivity. If a so-called scientific 
investigation is treated to doses of emotive interests, it tends to fall short of the expectations of objectivity in 
science, in being value-laden and therefore, subjective. At the same time, if the work reveals a dispassionate 
assessment in being considered value-free, it acquires the scientific character of being labelled objective. 
Thus, the true lot of scientific investigation is in attaining the status of objectivity. To this end, Waizbord 
(2004: 152) concurs that there is the “temptation to equate the natural sciences with objectivity….”
We need to note that once the nature of science is put in this form, the challenge of exactitude or 
precision remains a goal. Scientific exactitude requires that the representation we make assumes the character 
of certitude or correctness. For instance, the concept, a circle, must pass only for such and reveal a round object 
owith 360  at all times and in all spaces. In other words, the choice for definitive identification that holds true 
and true always and everywhere must of necessity be sustained. All scientific representations, then, are 
expected to be exact. 
Besides, we often emphasise exactitude in scientific investigation to court concerns about the 
quantification dimensions in natural science. As a task-driven engagement, we aspire for precision insisting 
on a hundred percent (100%) in outcomes. In that wise, we make attempt to attain the exact to justify the 
factual or reality. Hence, it is also the goal of scientific investigation to draw up generalizations based 
on concrete or exact facts. In this wise, precision cannot be compromised for all scientific 
investigations.
The natural science prides in making exact representations of natural phenomena. It begins 
with simple observation that focuses on regularities in pattern characterizing the phenomenon under 
investigation. It is expected that, in the cause of observing and reporting, we should not allow for 
emotive or ethical considerations to ensure that we attain a value free conclusion. By so doing, such 
investigation then merits the characterization of an objective assessment as it yields what “is” rather 
than anything else. Subjective concerns therefore, represent limitations in the development of a 
properly ordered scientific investigation. By its very nature, all scientific investigation should remain 
open-ended as to allow for any doubting party to try and replicate the experience and attain the same 
result. Such process allows for proof to falsify and jettison claims where it proves doubtful or false; or 
validate claims, where it holds true. It is therefore, in the nature of the empirical or natural sciences to 
“aspire to” what Wolf (1968:94) refers to as “condition of methodological grace” in being value-free... 
rather than being merely exercises in the prejudiced distortion of … facts” (Allen, 1975: 95).
Essentially, there is a permanent preoccupation of empirical science with methods. For, we 
often talk about the scientific method and by that we mean “a method of inquiry designed to explain 
natural phenomenon” (Hajjar, 1971: 145). As a method of inquiry or investigation, it enables us to 
attain “scientific knowledge” which, as argued by Miller (1979: 16), “provides a foundation for 
technological advances, for the solution of practical problems that arise in the daily affairs of ordinary 
people”. Indeed, the concern for scientific knowledge gives credence to a number of interests that help 
to hold investigations in a compact form to properly define it as science. Easton (1967 : 13) points this 
out in his eight (8) “intellectual foundation stones (of science) that include regularities, verification, 
techniques, quantification, value freeness, systematization, pure science and integration”. As a 
methodological process, it is a major preoccupation of scientific knowledge to therefore, reject 
distortion of the fact.
The Social Science Agenda: Nature and Interest
The dualized nature of science reveals the natural and social sciences. Whereas the natural 
sciences deal essentially with inanimate nature like matter, the lot of the social sciences has man as the 
epicentre of its discussions. The concern with man, therefore, defines the preoccupation with humanity. 
To this extent, because we refer to man as a social being, we derive the referent, “social being”, from the 
systematic study of humanity in its widest ramifications. Social beings are rationally driven pulsating 
beings and are, therefore, the prime object of social scientific investigations.
Earlier on, we referred to social science as the “Other Science”. By so doing, we mean to 
emphasise that it is a derived enterprise as it is patterned on the standards of the natural sciences. By 
implication, social scientific investigations are expected to adopt the methods and procedures of the 
natural sciences in the development of its interests. In other words, as scientific enterprise, it is 
considered an empirical interest. For such reason, the knowledge it claims must be experiential and 
replicable. Yet the sense in which we hold knowledge claims as replicable in the social sciences differ 
from that of natural sciences. Like inanimate nature, we cannot hold man constant as alternative or 
control element. However, as argued by Dilman (1996 :121), in the social sciences,
the knowledge they seek (as scientific knowledge) which is the only kind of 
knowledge they recognize  is impersonal, general, inductive, (and) theoretical. It is 
to be applied to particular cases so as to obtain an understanding of individual 
people and help them to deal more efficiently with . . . problems….
Therefore, we tend to invest in social science methods and procedures derived from natural sciences to 
generate what can pass for credible generalizations. Indeed, it draws on the ideal of causality to state 
issues in terms of 'if A, then B,' kind of relations.
As scientific enterprise, therefore, the social sciences are involved in providing explanations to 
phenomenon that defines social reality. Essentially, it takes pride in description and explanation of these 
relations between humanity writ large and doing so with a focus on regularities associated with human 
behaviours.  It is expected that from the set of observable data that underscore the regularities in pattern, a 
social scientist would be able to draw-up law-like statements or, generalization that hold true and true, 
always and at all times. In other words, the truth of social reality should not be limited by space and time as 
to qualify as scientific. Thus, for the social sciences, there is a preoccupation with telling the truth about 
what constitutes social reality. Hence, it is in this respect that Flectcher (1969:341) posits that “the crucial 
impact of the social sciences on the world at large is one of demystification”.
The latter refers to a process of avoiding distortions to the fact and presenting or representing it as it 
is. Dealing with demystification therefore, is necessary to enable us lay bare the truth about social matter. As 
Kaufman (1938:442) commented,
The social scientist who deals with more general questions of his discipline soon meets 
problems which he cannot solve with the (distorted) knowledge at his disposal and with 
the methods familiar to him. Frequently such problems are presented to him by practical 
life; it is found that with the change of circumstance, general proposition which have 
hitherto served well, and have thus been considered absolute and unshakable laws, can 
no longer, or can only with modifications, stand the test of experience.
By the attempt to replicate that experience, we seek to prove the validity or falsities associated with 
prevailing knowledge claims, and reject whatever passes for distortion or falsehood. Thus, the opportunity 
to try and re-try to prove the truth-value of claims is equally made necessary by the fact that its conclusions 
must subscribe to the tenet of open-endedness that characterizes natural science investigations.
It is therefore, in the nature and interest of social science to seek and persistently plead the truth 
relative to human behaviour.  Doing so, it is agreed, requires the adoption of the procedures and methods 
derived from the natural sciences. In accepting natural sciences as the standard, we draw on it to equally 
search for exactitude or facts about social matter. Howbeit, it is the case that social beings are thinking 
beings, and cannot be held constant in the same way we do inanimate matter. Therefore, there is the 
recognition that while it is right and proper to abstract self as a disinterested party, in the drawing of 
generalizations, a certain flow, if minimal, of emotive or ethical considerations may check our expectation 
of exactitude with our conclusions. Thus, we often give room to such vagaries as may be caused by the 
minimal injection of interest or value in the process of investigating social beings. This implies that it is 
often difficult to attain a point of precision at a hundred percent (100%).
To give consideration to possible error that may distort knowledge, it is hoped that it should so 
minimal as to make our conclusions equally agreeable. Hence, for reasons of the minimal limit of error, we 
often consider the vagaries as a check on exactitude. To this end, the hopeful aspiration of social science 
then, is to attain the proximate cause. In other words, we target our conclusions to what is nearest to the exact 
to sustain conclusions reached as valid and credible. This implies that it recognizes that, though minimal 
distortions may exist, there is need to ensure that our generalizations merit the label of proper scientific 
investigation.
Essentially therefore, social science is as abhorrent of distortions as natural science. While its 
aspiration focuses on exactitude in the reporting and representations of social reality, it hardly prides in 
giving room for emotive consideration for the error of distortion that often stems from the injection of 
subjective interest in emotive or ethical considerations. Hence, it earns the label, 'inexact science', because 
of considerations for social vagaries that check the aspirations of exactitude. Yet, it is to the explanation and 
description of reality that it focuses on. The prime subject of concern, then, is human behaviour in its fullest 
extent. Both in terms of methods and procedures of investigation, it draws on the methods and strategies of 
knowledge. Hence, as the “other science”, it is duly laced with scientific rigour to merit being considered a 
scientific enterprise.
Conclusion
The paper has attempted to examine the dualised platform of scientific knowledge giving rise to 
natural science and social science. It pleads for a careful appraisal of these concerns by the new entrant into 
the university who would sooner than latter be confronted with the demands of cross-disciplinary 
engagement necessary to shrink the boundary of intellectual parochialism. In arguing for the promotion of 
cross disciplinary interest between new knowledge seekers at the university level, it is believed that a fair 
understanding of the logic of both sciences can help improve the concerns for cross disciplinary studies for 
all scientists. 
Social scientists, like natural scientists, are united by methods and procedures for attaining 
generalizations or law-like conclusions. However, the subject matter of experience varies. In the case of 
social science, largely thought of as inexact science, the prime focus is on Man. Human behaviour, in all its 
ramifications, preoccupies the social scientist in his scientific investigation. For the natural sciences, 
which largely deal with inanimate matter, the quest for exactitude defines their representation of reality. 
Therefore, both strands of science, being important knowledge claims on reality, can only be viewed from 
the standpoint of their methods, strategies and procedures, to qualify as science. For the new entrant or 
freshman, an idea of both realms of science leaves him with a sense of balance on empirical knowledge 
claim.
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